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ABSTRACT
This article reviews the Constitution Unit’s Interim Report of the Working Group 
on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland. After placing referendums 
in the context of political history and theory, the paper critically analyses the 
report’s discussion of when a referendum is likely to be called. Following this, 
the paper reviews the Constitution Unit’s analysis of the rules regulating these 
referendums. It is concluded that the report provides an exemplary starting 
point for future discussions. There are gaps, however. For example, the report 
says virtually nothing about online campaigning. This is especially puzzling as 
research has shown that online campaigning (through social media) contrib-
uted to disinformation in previous referendums in Britain. Both Ireland and the 
United Kingdom should follow the lead of Estonia, Iceland, Latvia and Portugal, 
and introduce restrictions on social media campaigning—or, explain why not.
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INTRODUCTION
‘Panic isn’t required; preparation for all eventualities is’. These are the words 
of Alex Kane, a former Ulster Unionist Party communications director and 
now ‘a prominent columnist in the Belfast Telegraph’.1 Since the 2016 Brexit 
referendum—in which a majority in Northern Ireland voted to stay in the 
EU, while the overall majority of voters in the United Kingdom voted to 
leave the European Union—a poll by Lord Ashcroft found a small majority 
of 51 percent of the voters in Northern Ireland in favour of unification.2 Not 
a massive upsurge, but still an indication that all do well in planning for ‘all 
eventualities’.
Mr Kane’s succinct assessment is cited in the modestly titled Interim 
Report of the equally inconspicuous sounding Working Group on Unification 
Referendums on the Island of Ireland.3 Behind the inobtrusive title is a group 
of what can only be described as the good and the great of all academic dis-
cussion pertaining to Northern Ireland. Under the chairmanship of Alan 
Renwick, of the Constitution Unit, at UCL, this report is the most comprehen-
sive analysis of all the issues concerning possible referendums on unification 
(or reunification) of the two jurisdictions on the island of Ireland.
Among the members of the stellar cast of academic lawyers and political 
scientists are Oran Doyle (a constitutional law professor at Trinity College 
Dublin), Cathy Gormley-Heenan (a political science professor at Ulster 
University) and Professor Brendan O’Leary, an Irish political scientist who 
has plied his trade for many years at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
who has recently written the authoritative account of the politics of Northern 
Ireland.4 The other members of the group are equally distinguished.
In matters related to Northern Ireland, it is customary to look for even the 
smallest signs of bias. Certainly, many of the contributors to this report have 
previously expressed views—even strong ones. That is to be expected. But the 
conclusions of the report are serious, sombre and occasionally even solemn. 
1 Alex Kane, ‘Unionists don’t need to panic about the border…however, they do need to be prepared’, Belfast 
Telegraph, 15 February 2019.
2 See: https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/09/my-northern-ireland-survey-finds-the-union-on-a-knife-edge/ 
(accessed 19 February 2021).
3 Alan Renwick et al., Interim Report of the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland, 
London Constitution Unit, UCL (October 2020). Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/
constitution-unit/files/wgurii_interim_report_nov_2020.pdf (5 March 2021).
4 Brendan O’Leary, A treatise on Northern Ireland: consociation and confederation. From antagonism to 
accommodation? (III Vols. Vol. III. Oxford, 2019).
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From an academic point of view, this report is testament to the validity of 
Max Weber’s famous conclusion that while the scholar might be directed by 
his or her preferences in the choice of object, the conclusions can be ‘valid for 
all who seek the truth’.5
This article is a review of the Interim Report. While it looks more generally 
at the questions pertaining to the right to hold Irish unification votes, the 
main focus will be on the regulation of referendums. Thus, in reviewing each 
of the sections, the present note will compare and contrast the findings and 
recommendations with norms and practices elsewhere.
REFERENDUMS ON UNIFICATION
The enthusiasm for—and the opposition against—referendums on national 
issues has waxed and waned since methods of direct democracy were first 
used to decide on issues concerning national self-determination, the drawing 
of borders and sovereignty. As this review is written for an academic or schol-
arly audience it is de rigueur to cite some of the historical precedents, if only 
in passing.
Depending on the definition, votes on unification and sovereignty have 
been held as far back as the fourteenth century. Then, votes were held in 
present-day France to escape the domination of the Holy Roman Empire. For 
example, in 1307, Lyonnais voted for independence in the first instance of 
what we might call a referendum.6 Under similar circumstances, male proper-
ty-owning citizens in Burgundy voted in 1527 to nullify the Treaty of Madrid, 
according to which the territory would be ceded to Spain. The vote was a tac-
tical masterstroke by the French King Francis I, who—having read Erasmus 
of Rotterdam—thought that he could undo the accord he had signed when he 
was in a weaker position.7
The proponents of letting the people decide included an impressive array 
of some of the greatest political theorists of history, which featured the likes 
5 Max Weber, ‘Objectivity in the social sciences’, in Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (eds), Max Weber on the 
methodology of the social sciences (Glencoe, Il, 1949), 84. Italics in the original.
6 Johannes Mattern, The employment of the plebiscite in the determination of sovereignty (Baltimore MD, 
1921), 37.
7 Sarah Wambaugh, The doctrine of self-determination: a study of the theory and practice of plebiscites (Vol. I. 
Oxford, 1919), xxiii.
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of John Locke, Hugo Grotius and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.8 However, it was 
not until the eighteenth century that this form of democratic consultation 
began to resemble what we today would consider to be a referendum in the 
proper sense of the word.
Modern democracy took a quantum leap forward with the American 
Revolution. All free men were entitled to vote, and it was recognised that 
the right to govern should not be limited to a small elite group. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this had an impact on the use of direct democracy. The first ref-
erendum in America was held in 1788 in Rhode Island, when voters were 
consulted on whether they wanted to give up their independence and join 
the newly minted United States. As it happened, they voted ‘no’, but—in 
what some will find to be an interesting parallel to the Irish referendums 
on, respectively, the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008—they 
were eventually forced to join the Federation.9
These early experiences continued in France, though here with a clearer 
ideological commitment to the sovereignty of the people as originally devel-
oped by Rousseau, ‘[the] revolution proclaimed as the fundamental principle 
of all government the principle of popular sovereignty’.10
Italian unification was accomplished through plebiscites between the late 
1840s and the early 1870s, and at the time, all major powers (including Russia 
and Prussia) were in principle in favour of resolving border issues through 
referendums. For example, the contentious issue of the border between 
Denmark and Germany was intended to be resolved through a plebiscite. 
Though Otto von Bismarck, having been victorious on the battlefield, was 
in no great hurry to implement the Treaty of Prague, the peace agreement 
which mandated a vote on the matter.
This was to be a pattern followed many times after that, telling us that 
a border dispute is to be settled by a referendum, but the stronger power 
prevaricates, and the weaker power is not in a position to demand that 
the promised referendum is held. Such is what happened in the aforemen-
tioned case of Schleswig Holstein. The same happened in Kashmir despite 
UN Security Council Resolution 47, which stated that ‘a plebiscite will be 
8 Matt Qvortrup, ‘A brief history of self-determination referendums before 1920’, Ethnopolitics 14 (5) (2015), 
547–54: 549.
9 See: Ruth Wallis Herndon and John E. Murray, ‘An economic interpretation of Rhode Island’s 1788 Referendum 
on the Constitution’, in Joshua Hall and Marcus Witcher (eds), Public choice analyses of American economic 
history (Vol. 1, Berlin, 2018), 117–35.
10 Mattern, The employment of the plebiscite, 24.
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held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and 
truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the Commission’s reso-
lution of 13 August 1948 [are met]’.11 That was 70 years ago at the time 
of writing. To date no referendum has been held. Kashmir is not the only 
example of this. A similar example is Western Sahara where a dispute over 
who should be allowed vote (and therefore who would win) has prevented 
the UN Security Council from dealing with it. Interestingly Ireland was 
credited with leading the successful block by the elected ten against the 
five permanent members of the UN Security Council to settle in Morocco’s 
favour in 2002.12
DECIDING WHEN TO CALL A REFERENDUM
The reason for drawing these historical facts to the reader’s attention is 
not merely to provide information that is of intrinsic interest to scholars 
but because the legal requirement to hold a referendum is one which may 
be subject to short—or long-term—political calculation, as it stands. As the 
authors of the report write, the starting point for any discussion about a ref-
erendum is the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which explicitly states that
[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland] shall exercise the 
power [to hold a referendum] if at any time it appears likely to 
him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that 
Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom 
and form part of a united Ireland.13
Such referendums may not take place within seven years of each other.
The authors of the Interim Report acknowledge that the prospects of a 
referendum may appear remote, and cite the previous and current secretar-
ies of state for Northern Ireland in saying that a referendum is not on the 
cards.
11 Resolution 47 (1948) [adopted by the Security Council at its 286th meeting] of 21 April 1948.
12 See Garret FitzGerald, ‘How Ireland punched above its weight at UN Security Council’, 11 July 2009, 
available at: https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/how-ireland-punched-above-its-weight-at-un-security-
council-1.697726 (7 March 2021).
13 Northern Ireland Act, Sch. 1 amended (16.2.2001) by 2000 c. 41, s. 102 (with s. 156(6)); S.I. 2001/222, art. 2, 
Sch. 1 Pt. I.
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Speaking in October 2019, the then Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, Julian Smith, said that he was not at all considering the 
question of a referendum and that ‘the Union was strong’ (BBC, 
The View, 2019). His successor Brandon Lewis has also refused to 
be drawn on the details of when a UK government would trigger 
a referendum both at the time of his appointment and since, in 
response to a question in the Commons.14
The crucial question, of course, is when it ‘appears likely’ that ‘a majority 
of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland’ join the Republic 
of Ireland. In the report, the authors cite survey evidence to the effect that 
there has been a surge in support for unification. Thus:
Until around 2013, almost all studies found support for unifica-
tion to be below 30%. Since then, results have become much more 
varied. While some studies continue to suggest little or no change, 
a small number since 2017 have placed support for unification at 
or close to 50%.15
The authors spend considerable time discussing what they call ‘the man-
datory duty’ to hold a referendum.16 But, once again, the report’s authors are 
admirably clear that the duty to call a poll is not based on solid legal ground. 
In their words, ‘“Likely” is not a term with a specific legal meaning. In this 
context, it can be presumed to mean simply “more probable than not”’.17
True, a High Court Judge opined in Re McCord, that
If the evidence leads the Secretary of State to believe that the 
majority would so vote then she has no choice but to call a border 
poll. It is necessarily implied in this provision that the Secretary 
of State must honestly reflect on the evidence available to her 
to see whether it leads her to the conclusion that the majority 
would be likely to vote in favour of a united Ireland. Evidence of 
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election results and opinion polls may form part of the evidential 
context in which to exercise the judgment whether it appears to 
the Secretary of State that there is likely to be a majority for a 
united Ireland.18
In the report the authors spend a fair bit of energy on analysing what 
might be meant by ‘evidence of election results’ and ‘opinion polls’. This 
seems at best optimistic, and at worst borders on naïveté.
It is legally possible that this obiter dicta from Re McCord has legal force. 
But it is unlikely to matter given the current political circumstances. The 
Conservative and Unionist Party in its manifesto before the General Election 
in the United Kingdom in 2019 stated that, it would ‘never be neutral on the 
Union and why we stand for a proud, confident, inclusive and modern union-
ism that affords equal respect to all traditions and parts of the community’.19
Moreover, this government is one which by its own admission is willing 
to ‘break international law in a very specific and limited way’—as expressed 
by the current secretary of state for Northern Ireland.20 Legally reprehensible 
and politically irresponsible though such statements are, the idea that the 
present administration would abide by anything as flimsy as the spirit of a 
two-decade old agreement, even obiter in a judicial review case, seems far-
fetched, and the report does not quite acknowledge this.
REFERENDUM REGULATION
The Interim Report stays on firmer ground when it deals with referendums. 
The section on the franchise is comprehensive and based on solid evidence 
from other jurisdictions, as well as soft law references from the Venice 
Commission’s recommendations regarding the conduct of referendums.21
Limiting the franchise—or extending it—is the oldest trick in the proverbial 
book for altering referendum outcomes, and it is prudent to devote space to 
18 Re McCord [2018] NIQB 106, para 20, per Girvin.
19 Conservative and Unionist Party, ‘Conservative Manifesto 2019: Get Brexit done and unleash Britain’s 
potential’ (London, 2019), 44.
20 Brendan Lewis, MP in House of Commons Debates, Volume 679, Tuesday 8 September 2020, Col. 509.
21 For the most recent update (completed after the Interim Report was published see: CDL-AD(2020)031-e 
Revised guidelines on the holding of referendums—Approved by the Council of Democratic Elections at its 69th 
online meeting (7 October 2020) and adopted by the Venice Commission at its 124th online Plenary Session 
(8–9 October 2020).
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this issue, even though the conclusion, ‘the “ordinary” franchise rules should 
apply’, seems a tad tame.22
The report is also on solid ground when it deals with the matter of special 
majority requirements. In some cases, a vote for independence has required 
more than a simple majority. For example, in 2006, it was a stipulation that 
independence for Montenegro would require the support of 55 percent of 
those voting, and in 2011 there was a 60 percent turnout requirement, in the 
referendum in South Sudan. The commission is against a similar measure in 
Northern Ireland, ‘Any qualified majority threshold would make it harder 
to change the status quo and would therefore favour the status quo. On the 
basic, binary question of sovereignty, that could not be justified’.23 From a 
legal point of view, this is in accordance with the Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
which states (Section 1.2) the determining factor in a future border poll is 
‘the wish expressed by a majority and the Government of Ireland’. But the 
position is also in line with the norm in most referendums on reunification. 
Of the 27 referendums on reunification that have taken place from Saarland in 
Germany through to Sylhet in present-day Bangladesh, the referendums were 
decided by a simple 50-percent-plus-one basis. The only exception to the rule 
was the two-round referendum in Newfoundland in 1948 on whether to join 
Canada. The reasoning in this section is clear, legally convincing and based on 
a solid review of the precedents.
As the reader of the Interim Report will have noticed, this is not a rev-
olutionary report. That is a compliment to its authors. Referendums are 
contentious, and to find common ground is no mean feat on an issue that has 
led to the loss of thousands of people’s lives.
One of the strengths of this report is that the authors are willing to 
depart from principle. To arrive at viable and appropriate regulations is not 
an abstract exercise. ‘In law everything is context’, a British judge famously 
noted.24
This principle is also true for political theory, and indeed, for practical 
politics. At the theoretical level, the late John Rawls spoke of the need to find 
a ‘reflective equilibrium’ between ideals and gut-feeling. That is, we may well 
revise our ‘judgments to conform to its principles even though the theory 
22 Interim Report, 182.
23 Interim Report, 173.
24 R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v. British Broadcasting Corporation, 2003, UKHL 23, per Lord Steyn.
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does not fit…existing judgments exactly…but rather the one which matches…
judgments in reflective equilibrium’.25
The same pragmatic approach (without the ‘wonkish’ reference to polit-
ical theory) seems to have been used in this report. The report sets out the 
different levels of regulation of campaign finance in the two jurisdictions. In 
Ireland there are few limits on how much money can be spent in referendum 
campaigns, whereas in the United Kingdom the Political Parties, Elections 
and Referendum Act 1999 (Generally known as PPERA) contains strict limits 
on campaign spending. Under this act, the Electoral Commission selects two 
‘designated’ umbrella groups who represent the two sides of the argument.
While the report seems sympathetic to the rationale behind the UK act, 
it finds upon reflection that this arrangement is unlikely to be suitable for 
Northern Ireland. As they write:
The system supposes that a single organisation can reasonably 
represent the broad range of perspectives on each side of the ref-
erendum debate. That might be difficult in the case of a unification 
referendum in Northern Ireland, and it might therefore be desir-
able to modify the system or set it aside for such a vote. It would 
be advisable to make such a change, however, only through wide 
consultation and seeking consensus.26
This seems a reasonable conclusion, and one that adds credence to the 
neutrality of the report. And, as a further sign of their fair-minded approach, 
there is also criticism of the lack of regulation of campaign finance in Ireland. 
The report duly acknowledges that:
In Ireland, the Standards in Public Office Commission has argued 
for limits on campaign spending and better controls on overseas 
spending, as well as for improved transparency of donations…[And 
that] The Citizens’ Assembly of 2016–18 similarly recommended 
that there should be regulation of spending, with 98% of members 
supporting overall spending limits in campaigns. It added that 
anonymous donations should be banned and that there should be 
public funding of each side of a referendum to an equal degree.27
25 John Rawls, A theory of justice (revised edn, Cambridge MA, 1999), 42–43.
26 Interim Report, 200.
27 Interim Report, 200.
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ONLINE CAMPAIGNING
One issue that has been strangely left out of the report is the regulation of 
online campaigning. In recent years, some of the most momentous electoral 
upsets have been a result of the use of internet campaigning. In the words of 
a recent study by this author and colleagues, it was noted that, ‘the innovative 
genius of the Trump Campaign was to use data harvesting to individually 
target voters (a practice known as micro targeting)’.28
That this issue is left out is also rather odd as the topic of online cam-
paigning was highlighted in Irish Standards in Public Office Commission, 
in the report issues in 2017. In this, concern was expressed that ‘Facebook 
campaigns are not regulated by this legislation—meaning individuals or 
groups from anywhere can pay for Facebook advertising targeting certain 
demographics of Irish voters’.29 While there is a reference to social media 
companies voluntarily banning foreign commercials in Irish referendums,30 
much more could have been written about the restrictions on online cam-
paigning that have been introduced in other European countries, including 
Estonia, Latvia, Iceland and Portugal.
As this is a crucially important issue, it is worth looking at the regulations 
in these countries at some length.
As far back as 2008, the Parliament of Estonia introduced the Advertising 
Act, which bans political advertising on the internet, including  ‘subliminal 
techniques’.31 This regulation has been updated yearly since its promulgation.
While comprehensive, the Estonian legislation pertaining to online adver-
tising is less detailed than in Latvia. In this country, the Law on National 
Referendum, Legislative Initiative and European Citizens’ Initiative has been 
continuously updated to take into account new developments in online adver-
tising.32 Thus, Chapter VI of the Act provides a ban on ‘hidden campaigning’, 
and explicitly cites advertising on the ‘Internet’; ‘Hidden  campaigning before 
28 This issue is dealt with at length in Lucy Atkinson, Andrew Blick, and Matt Qvortrup, The referendum in 
Britain: a history (Oxford, 2020), 198.
29 ‘How many foreign groups are buying Facebook ads as part of the abortion referendum debate?’ Journal.ie, 
25 March 2018. Available at: https://www.thejournal.ie/kanto-vote-referendum-3914073-Mar2018/ (20 January 
2021).
30 Interim Report, 204.
31 Advertising Act, 12.03.2008, ‘Riigi Teataja’ I 2008, 15, 108, Art. 11.
32 Latvijas Vēstnesis [Latvian Journal of Law], 47 (178), 20.04.1994.
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a national referendum, hidden campaigning for a legislative initiative or 
hidden campaigning for the initiative to revoke the Saeima is prohibited’.33
This type of regulation is not just known in the Baltic countries. Some 
countries in Western Europe have similarly sought to regulate online cam-
paigning. One of these is Iceland. Until the financial collapse of the island 
nation’s economy in 2008, there had been no nationwide referendums since 
1944 when the country voted to sever ties with Denmark. However, as a con-
sequence of the political crisis and massive debt caused by the bankruptcy of 
the IceSave and Kaupthing banks, the Icelandic president took the unusual 
and unprecedented step of vetoing the agreement the government had made 
with the country’s international creditors.34 This resulted in two referendums, 
in 2010 and 2011, in which the government’s plans were rejected by over 
90 percent of the voters. Following this referendum, the voters approved six 
amendments to the constitution in a non-binding referendum in 2012.35 This 
upsurge in the use of the referendum in Iceland was accompanied by a detailed 
set of regulations of online campaigning. While not as comprehensive as that 
of the Baltic states, the Icelandic government recently implemented a law 
on online anonymous campaigning. Political bodies are now prohibited from 
financing or taking part in the publishing of any campaign-related material 
without making their affiliation public.36
In Portugal, similar legislation pertaining to the use of the internet is subject 
to the same regulations as in other media. According to the Portuguese legis-
lation, the social media must ensure, ‘balance, representativeness, and equity 
in the treatment of news, reporting of facts or events of informative value’.37 
Thus, ‘In the use of the Internet, the media [must] observe, with due adapta-
tions, the same rules to which they are obliged by this law, in relation to the 
other means of communication’. Thus, while all actors ‘shall at all times enjoy 
full freedom of use of social networks and other means of expression through 
the Internet’, there are limits. For example, it is illegal to use these media, ‘for 
the dissemination of campaign content on election days eve (reflexion day)’, 
33 Advertising Act 2008 Art 31 (3).
34 K.A. Curtis, J. Jupille and D. Leblang, ‘Iceland on the rocks: the mass political economy of sovereign debt 
resettlement’, International Organization 68 (3) (2014), 721–40.
35 See: Tom Dobber, Ronan Ó Fathaigh and Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘The regulation of online political 
micro-targeting in Europe’, Internet Policy Review 8 (4) (2019). https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.4.1440. 
36 These examples are further discussed in Matt Qvortrup, Democracy on demand: holding power to account 
(Manchester, 2021).
37 Lei n.º 72-A/2015, Art. 6.
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and there is a ban on ‘the use of commercial advertising’.38 In cases of viola-
tion of these regulations, there is a sanctioning regime, according to which 
breach of rules pertaining to commercial advertising may result in fines of 
between €15,000 and €75,000.39
It is difficult to see why similar regulations could not be introduced in 
Ireland and in the United Kingdom in future referendums on unification of 
the two jurisdictions on the island of Ireland.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Referendums are contentious, and sometimes democratic theory has not taken 
this fully into account. In 1915, when Irish independence was not seen as a 
realistic prospect by many in Britain, the English historian Arnold Toynbee—
an enthusiast for referendums to settle national and ethnic issues—opined 
that, ‘if the plebiscite decides for separatism, there is no more to be said about 
the political question’.40
The Border Poll in 1973, and other referendums, have shown that referen-
dums in general, and those involving issues of ethnic and national politics 
in particular, can lead to what some scholars called ‘an anarchy of referen-
dums’.41 Reflecting on the abuse of referendums that took place in the early 
1990s, a British political scientist and pundit concluded that ‘referendums 
cannot be used for this’ (settling of ethnic and territorial disputes).42
This thoroughly researched report proves that individual wrong. This is a 
good primer for anyone contemplating a referendum, and anyone interested 
in the topic must read it. Yet, the authors are uncharacteristically modest, 
writing in the conclusion: ‘This is an interim version of our report. We are 
publishing it now because we would like to hear others’ thoughts on our draft 
analysis and draft conclusions. We claim no monopoly of wisdom, and we 
look forward to feed-back on our interim findings’.43 
Democracy is about finding compromises, and this report with its 
open and transparent account is a fine example of consensus democracy 
38 Lei n.º 72-A/2015, Art. 11.
39 Lei n.º 72-A/2015, Art. 12.
40 Arnold Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London, 1915), 251.
41 H.E. Brady and C.S. Kaplan, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, David Butler and Austin Ranney 
(eds), Referendums around the world: the growing use of direct democracy (London, 1994), 174–217: 206.
42 Vernon Bogdanor, Politics and the constitution (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1996) 5.
43 Interim Report, 216.
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in practice. As such the report is written in the spirit of the Good Friday 
Agreement. One must hope that the politicians (and the voters) will be ani-
mated by this spirit when (or if) they are called upon to vote in a referendum 
on Irish unification.
Read a Response by Eileen Connolly, 
‘The Rules for Holding Referendums on Irish Unity’,
https://doi.org/10.3318/ISIA.2021.32b.17
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